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INEQUALITY "FROM THE
TOP": APPLYING AN ANCIENT





Two constitutional provisions, the equal protection and due
process clauses, provide generalized protection when the govern-
ment distributes burdens or benefits-when it gives something to,
or takes something away from, citizens. I In addition, a number of
special provisions-the bill of attainder clause, 2 the takings
clause 3 and the antislavery amendments4-shield persons against
particular forms of governmental taking.
Does the Constitution contain anything analogous to these
special protections that limits the government in connection with
giving? Ordinary due process and equal protection, of course, pro-
hibit grants, exemptions, and other forms of governmental lar-
gesse that serve no rational purpose whatsoever-that amount, in
short, to simple favoritism. 5 And the establishment clause 6 and
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions7 prohibit grants to reli-
* Visiting Professor, University of Pennsylvania School of Law; Professor of
Law, University of California, Los Angeles. J.D. University of California, Berkeley,
1974. An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the University of Pennsylvania
Law School in January, 1984. I gratefully acknowledge Alan Brownstein's assistance
in preparing this Article.
1. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; see id. amends. VI, VII (criminal due process).
2. Id. art. I, §§ 9-10.
3. Id. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken . . . without just
compensation").
4. Id amends. XIII, XIV, XV. The thirteenth amendment, forbidding slavery,
also applies to private action.
5. Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184, 191 (1964); see also Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I (Congress forbidden to pass laws establishing religion).
7. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW § 5-22, at 310-17 (1978).
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gious groups and grants that require the recipient to relinquish a
fundamental right.
But suppose the government wishes to confer an uncondi-
tional, substantial, and enduring benefit on a few favorites and
can point to a plausible reason for doing so. In the case of slavery,
it was argued that maintaining a permanently disadvantaged class
to perform menial labor allows music, literature, and science to
flourish and is thus justifiable on utilitarian grounds. 8 This argu-
ment was, of course, rejected; even if the unhappiness of the slave
purchases a greater gain to the rest of society, considerations of
fairness and humanity forbid such a trade-off. If deliberate crea-
tion of a small, super-privileged class appeared to promote utility,
should it, too, be rejected for the same reasons? Relatively little
commentary9 and only a handful of cases have addressed this
question.
Recent developments suggest it will soon require attention,
however. Commentators, including a presidential commission,
have warned that selective distribution of biological benefits, such
as organ transplants, life extension, cloning, or "Nobel Prize
sperm banks" could cause irreversible shifts in the distribution of
wealth and influence in society and should be opposed for that
reason.' 0 Analyses of President Reagan's economic program have
found that program to be creating a new elite and a perpetual
underclass." Two United States Supreme Court decisions, one
8. Hare, What is Wrong With Slavery, 8 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 103 (1979); see J.
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 158-60, 325-32 (1971).
9. See R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 179-80 (1976) (observing that
most forms of hierarchy are hard for law to reach); Note, Eugenic Artficial Insemina-
tion: A Curefor Mediocrity, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1850 (1981) [hereinafter cited as In-
semination]; Note, Asexual Reproduction and Genetic Engineering-. A Constitutional
Assessment of the Technology of Cloning, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 476 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Reproduction]; Comment, Titles ofNobiity and the Preferential Treatment of
Federally Employed Military Veterans, 19 WAYNE L. REV. 1169 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Titles ofNobility].
10. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SPLICING LIFE: A REPORT ON THE
SOCIAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES OF GENETIC ENGINEERING WITH HUMAN BEINGS
(1982); see also Insemination, supra note 9; Almond, Cart & Harvey, Athletes Depriv-
ing Children in Need ofDrug, L.A. Times, Nov. 12, 1983, pt. 1II, at 1, col. I (scarce
human growth hormone, needed to treat dwarfism, being purchased by athletes seek-
ing gains in performance); Plan to Sell Kidneys for Transplants Draws Fire, L.A.
Times, Sept. 24, 1983, pt. I, at 5, col. I (furor over entrepreneur's disclosure of inten-
tion to buy human organs for transplant) [hereinafter cited as Plan to Sell Kidneys];
infra notes 179-87 and accompanying text (discussion of hypothetical program to dis-
tribute biological benefits).
11. See generally THE REAGAN EXPERIMENT (J. Palmer & I. Sawhill eds. 1982)
[hereinafter cited as EXPERIMENT]; see also sources cited infra note 64 (inequality and
governmental favoritism on the increase in American life). At least one group of
foreign observers believes that American hierarchy is here to stay. Debrett's, which
publishes the directory of Britain's nobility, recently announced its intention to pub-
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dealing with educational quotas, 12 the other with an Alaskan dis-
tribution of mineral wealth,'3 grapple, if only obliquely, with
some of these issues.
These developments suggest that it is time to focus on what
equality requires when it is not a taking that is at stake, but a
giving. Until recently, it seemed safe to assume that a relatively
caste-free society, with adequate provision for upward mobility,
could be assured merely by protecting those at the bottom of the
socioeconomic ladder from outright oppression by those at the top
and in the middle. 14 Over the course of a century, legislation and
case law were developed to lighten the competitive burden minor-
ities, women, and the poor bore and to assure that the government
did not take things-property, liberty, dignity, life-from them
without just cause. 15
But equality may be eroded in two ways, not just one. Unless
we recognize that the government's power to enrich A, while ig-
noring B, can cause inequality between A and B just as surely as
its power to impoverish B directly, we risk repeating the error of
the universal story's herdsman whose goats were stolen while he
attended to another danger. 16 This Article focuses on this more
insidious-because less visible-and less thoroughly analyzed
source of inequality. Part I reviews current Supreme Court doc-
trine dealing with giving. Part II proposes a new test for official
giving, based on two little-used constitutional provisions-the an-
tinobility clausesl 7-and traces their history and development.
lish Debrett's Texas Peerage. This will be the first of ten volumes devoted to "the
untitled aristocracy" in the United States. Peters, Tilting at Windmills, WASH.
MONTHLY, Oct. 1983, at 4, 6-7.
12. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287-99 (1978)
(Powell, J., plurality opinion) (affirmative action quota for blacks held impermissible
in part because system would distribute scarce resource--space in medical school
class-on basis of class membership rather than individual merit).
13. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982), discussed infra notes 39-42, 62-63 and
accompanying text.
14. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 213, 219-20 (1982) (equal protection clause is
aimed at preventing creation of a permanent underclass). But see C.W. MILLS, THE
POWER ELITE (1956) (wealthy and powerful groups may exert disproportionate influ-
ence on government); sources cited infra note 123.
15. See generally D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (1980) (summa-
rizing legal developments in civil rights legislation in areas of housing, employment,
voting rights, and protection from police brutality and mob action).
16. In an African folk tale, a young boy is left in charge of a herd of goats. The
elders warn him to be especially careful that jackals do not attack the herd during the
night. The boy remains awake until dawn; the jackals do not come. The next day,
the boy becomes bored and amuses himself by playing a counting game. While he is
engrossed in his game, thieves from another tribe steal the herd. The moral of the
story, which seems to have parallels in the folk wisdom of most cultures, is that it is
easy to become so mesmerized by one danger that one overlooks a second, equally
serious threat.
17. The clauses read: "No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States
[Vol. 32:100
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Parts III and IV address the strengths and weaknesses of an anti-
nobility approach. A final section illustrates analysis under the
approach through examples.
I. JUSTICE IN GIVING
Since virtually abandoning substantive due process as a
ground for invalidating socioeconomic legislation,' 8 the Supreme
Court rarely has struck down governmental programs that distrib-
uted bounty-licenses, money, exemptions, monopolies, or other
benefits-unequally. Most exceptions could be explained by stan-
dard political-process concerns, such as exclusion of a suspect
class 19 or impact on a constitutional right.20 When neither of
these was present, the Court generally has rejected challenges, in-
voking a number of now-familiar maxims.
21
New Orleans v. Dukes22 and Kotch v. Board of River Port Pi-
lot Commissioners23 illustrate the deferential review the Court af-
fords a governmental program when an individual challenges its
distribution of an ordinary benefit. In Dukes, a state statute ex-
cluded pushcart vendors from New Orleans' French Quarter but
exempted vendors who had operated in the Quarter for eight years
or more.24 An excluded vendor challenged the statute under the
equal protection clause. Since the statute neither burdened funda-
mental rights nor classified on the basis of suspect characteristics
such as race, the Court declined to act as a "super-legislature" by
reviewing the desirability of the legislation; 25 it asked only
.U.S. CON T. art. I, § 9; "No State shall ...grant any Title of Nobility
.id. § 10.
18. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 442 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as CONSTITUTIONAL LAW]; L. TRIBE, supra
note 7, § 8-7.
19. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); see United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938); L. TRIBE, supra note 7, §§ 16-12 to -14, at 1010-18,
1052-60.
20. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1967); United States v. Carolene Prods.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938); L. TRIBE, supra note 7, §§ 10-8, 16-7 to -12, at
.510, 1002-11.
21. E.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) (courts will not overturn deci-
sions of a political branch merely because they think them unwise); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (laws not unconstitutional because they lack math-
ematical nicety or logical precision); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966)
(same); Day-Brite Lighting v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952) (court does not sit as
"super-legislature" to weigh wisdom of legislation); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas
Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911) (legislation upheld "if any state of facts reasonably can be
conceived that would sustain it").
22. 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (per curiam).
23. 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
24. 427 U.S. at 298.
25. Id. at 303-04.
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whether the exemption for eight-year vendors was rationally re-
lated to reducing congestion in the French Quarter. 26 Finding
such a relationship, the Court upheld the statute.
27
In Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Commissioners,28 the
Supreme Court upheld a Louisiana statute which required per-
sons who wished to qualify as river pilots to apprentice themselves
to a licensed pilot. Evidence showed that licensed pilots almost
invariably selected friends and family members as apprentices, so
that river pilot jobs remained in family circles for generations.
29
Despite its overtones of nepotism and racial favoritism, the Court
upheld the Louisiana scheme, finding that the state might have
instituted it for legitimate reasons.
The many cases in the Dukes-Kotch mold have led some to
generalize that, outside the special situations named earlier, the
government is free to distribute largesse as it pleases. 30 A small
group of decisions suggests otherwise. In these decisions, the
Court invalidated distributions that did not classify on the basis of
suspect criteria, infringe on a fundamental right, or lack any ra-
tional basis. Indeed, nothing about the persons excluded or the
benefit distributed explains the invalidation; the Court struck
down the distribution because of its effect on the class benefited or
on society as a whole.
Morey v. Doud 31 concerned an Illinois statute requiring any
firm selling or issuing money orders in the state to obtain a license
and submit to regulation. The statute exempted one firm, Ameri-
can Express, by name. When other firms in the money order busi-
ness challenged the statute, the Supreme Court struck it down.32
In explaining its unusual action, the Court acknowledged the
state's power to make regulatory discriminations for legitimate
reasons, such as preventing currency abuse or assuring the fiscal
26. Id at 304-05.
27. Id. at 303-04.
28. 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
29. Id. at 554-55.
30. Eg., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 18, at 444-48. In some of the cases, a
disappointed person excluded from a benefit sues to be included. Eg., Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding welfare ceilings). In other cases, the chal-
lenger sues not to be included in a distribution, but to stop the giveaway altogether.
Eg., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (per curiam). In the absence
of a suspect class or a fundamental interest, courts generally treat both types of cases
in the same way-by applying a minimum rationality test. This Article is principally
concerned with cases of the second type-ones in which someone sees the government
providing a valuable benefit to a small group and wants to have it stopped, rather
than to have himself or herself included.
31. 354 U.S. 457 (1957), overruled, City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297,
306 (1976) (per curiam); see infra notes 44, 176-78 and accompanying text (discussing
Supreme Court opinion overruling Doua).
32. 354 U.S. at 469.
[Vol. 32:100
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integrity of firms in the money order business. 33 Nevertheless, the
Court found the statute impermissibly created a "closed class"
whose advantage would be perpetual and unreviewable. 34 The
Court did not state why such classes should not be created.
In Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Insurance Co. v. Harri-
son,35 the Supreme Court struck down state legislation that per-
mitted foreign insurance companies to sell policies only through
licensed resident agents. The statute defined "resident agent" to
include salaried employees of mutual insurance companies, but
not those of stock companies. 36 A stock company that wanted to
sell insurance through salaried employees challenged the statute
on equal protection grounds. The Court agreed with the state that
there are significant differences between mutual insurance and
stock companies but found that the state's decision to benefit one
at the expense of the other did not bear any relation to those dif-
ferences. 37 As with Doud, the Court did not explain why the state
could not be permitted to aid one type of company and not an-
other; it merely found that such "[d]iscriminations of an unusual
character" warrant judicial suspicion.
38
In the recent decision of Zobel v. Williams, 39 the Supreme
Court struck down an Alaskan program to distribute surplus
wealth resulting from mineral income. The program would have
distributed the proceeds according to the number of years a citizen
had resided in the state.40 Chief Justice Burger's opinion pointed
out that the distribution would create fixed, "permanent classes
a result [that] would be clearly impermissible. ' '41 Although
the state argued that its distributional scheme had a number of
rational bases, including rewarding its citizens for loyalty, none
could justify a reward system based on "permanent classes."' 42
The Court did not explain why such classes were undesirable, per-
haps thinking the reason self-evident.
These equal protection decisions, taken together, suggest an
unarticulated principle of heightened scrutiny that comes into
play when the Supreme Court reviews certain types of state-spon-
sored giving. The principle seems to operate even when a distri-
butional program does not trench on a traditionally protected
33. Id. at 465-68.
34. Id. at 467-68.
35. 301 U.S. 459 (1937).
36. Id at 460.
37. Id. at 463.
38. Id. at 462.
39. 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
40. Id at 56.
41. Id. at 64.
42. Id
19841
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interest or exclude a suspect class.43 Its contours are not easy to
draw: It seems to result in invalidation of programs that confer
benefits permanently and unreviewably; that establish groups apt
to be perceived as privileged or "special"; and that create closed
classes.
Such decisions may, of course, be simple anomalies."a But I
do not think so: They correspond to strongly held intuitions about
the way we want our society to function. Two existing legal doc-
trines, the public purpose doctrine45 and the principle of equal re-
spect for persons, 46 come close to capturing the spirit of the
decisions just described but ultimately fail fully to explain them.
The public purpose doctrine requires that the state spend only for
the public good, a requirement easily met; courts have stretched to
find public purposes in the most dubious spending schemes. 47
Moreover, the distributional programs in Doud, Harrison, and
Zobel did not lack public purposes; they merely advanced them in
43. See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 180 (1980)
(Stevens, J., concurring) ("When Congress deprives a small class of persons of vested
rights that are protected-and, indeed, even enhanced-for others who are in a simi-
lar though not identical position, I believe the Constitution requires something more
than merely a 'conceivable' or a 'plausible' explanation for the unequal treatment.").
44. Indeed, when the Supreme Court overruled Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457
(1957), in City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 306 (1976) (per curiam), it
treated the earlier decision as an aberration, id ("needlessly intrusive judicial in-
fringement on the State's legislative powers"), failing to come to grips with its earlier
intuition about the dangers posed by closed classes possessing special privileges. See
infra notes 176-78 and accompanying text (concluding that Douds overruling, while a
close case, was correct).
45. See generally Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1874); Opinion
of the Justices, 211 Mass. 624, 98 N.E. 611 (1912).
46. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 182, 272-74 (1977); Karst,
Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REV. 245, 272 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Equality];
Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword" Equal Citizenship Under the Four-
teenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977); Shiffrin, Liberalism, Radicalism, and
Legal Scholarship, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1103, 1121-30 (1983).
47. Bowker v. Baker, 73 Cal. App. 2d 653, 167 P.2d 256 (1946) (public transpor-
tation for students attending parochial schools); People ex rel. City of Salem v.
McMackin, 53 111. 2d 347, 291 N.E.2d 807 (1972) (bond-lease scheme to set up indus-
trial parks); cf. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984) (public use
doctrine in eminent domain proceedings given very broad interpretation, coterminous
with state police power; moreover, courts will not second-guess state legislature's find-
ing that a given purpose is public).
For a discussion of the view that a "public interest/public good" model of judi-
cial review would require more intense scrutiny of state action than courts generally
apply, see Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination. Compet-
ing Judicial Models of Local Governmental Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145 (1977-1978).
Current thinking allows a wide scope for economic experiments and even nest-feath-
ering by pressure groups, regulators, and politicians. Levine, Revisionism Revised?
Airline Deregulation and the Public Interest, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179 (1981);
Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 335 (1974);
see A. DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY chs. 6, 13 (1957).
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ways the Court found unacceptable.4 8 Equal respect for persons49
seems no more fruitful. The constitutional bases from which the
principle derives are aimed at preventing oppressive treatment of
persons and classes at the bottom of society;50 they do not cur-
rently reach state action aimed at benefiting those at the top.5'
Further, challenges under these principles are unlikely to prevail
unless a challenger can show that review should be strict; with
most giving programs, this will not be the case.
Since existing specialized doctrines seem incapable of dealing
with unjust governmental giving, three possibilities remain. Im-
proper state giveaways could be dealt with, as in the past, through
sporadic invalidations invoking general principles of equal protec-
tion and due process. This approach has dangers: it gives a court
a great deal of discretion and results in unpredictable jurispru-
dence, viz., the unexpected and poorly explained overruling of
Doud in New Orleans v. Dukes. Alternatively, courts could de-
velop a new layer of doctrine within the equal protection or due
process clause. This approach, too, has difficulties-these clauses
already bear a great deal of weight; their elasticity seems to be
approaching a limit.52 A final approach consists of identifying a
48. See supra notes 31-42 and accompanying text.
49. See Equality, supra note 46, for a leading statement of this principle; see also
R. DWORKIN, supra note 46; Shiffrin, supra note 46. The principle holds that every
citizen is entitled to be treated in a way that respects his or her basic humanity and
individuality.
50. L. TRIBE, supra note 7, §§ 7-2, 16-1, -15, at 416-21, 992-93, 1019-22 (due
process and equal protection, the main legal anchors for principle of equal respect, see
Equality, supra note 46, are primarily aimed at avoiding exploitation of the powerless
by the powerful).
51. The philosophic bases of the principle of equal respect are somewhat more
expansive than its legal anchors, however, and may be able to generate a theory of the
type needed. See I. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 11-13,
20, 36-49 (T. Abbott trans. 1949) (1st ed. Riga 1785) (persons to be treated as ends,
not means); 1. KANT, Critique of Judgment, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT 347 (C.
Friedrich ed. 1949) (man is the end of nature, the creature to whom all other things
and creatures are subservient and to whom ultimate respect is due); see also R.
DWORKIN, supra note 46, at 179-81; C. FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES 40-60
(1970); Shiffrin, supra note 46. Persistent Western liberal themes that emphasize each
person's uniqueness and value could support any of the three identified alternative
approaches to controlling unequal state largesse below. See generally Shiffrin, supra
note 46, at 1127-30.
52. E.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
L.J. 920 (1973); Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword" In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court.- A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1, 41-43 (1972). As is often the case with articles of this type, there is a
tension between arguing that judicial currents make the development of new doc-
trines plausible and yet asserting that existing case law is inadequate to cope with the
problems under consideration. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). A physical metaphor illustrates this tension. Equality-
protecting doctrine may be compared to a river whose flow has suddenly increased. A
present dam is inadequate to contain its waters. Either the dam will need to be ex-
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new constitutional source capable of generating values and doc-
trine to deal with unjustified giving. The remainder of this Article
is concerned with this final approach.
The most promising such source appears to be the anti-
nobility clauses of Article 1, sections 9 and 10, of the United States
Constitution.5 3 Enacted after relatively little discussion at the
Constitutional Convention 54 and invoked only infrequently there-
after,55 the clauses provide a plausible source from which courts
could develop doctrines to deal with official giving. Although os-
tensibly aimed only at preventing government from issuing honor-
ific titles, such as count or king, the clauses have been used to
invalidate more tangible acts of official favoritism.
56
In addition to lower court decisions that invoke the anti-
nobility clauses directly, three United States Supreme Court deci-
sions have mentioned them in concurring or dissenting opinions,
suggesting their possible revival as sources of equality-protecting
doctrine. In 1980, in Fullilove v. Klutznick,57 the Court upheld a
set-aside provision in the Public Works Employment Act. Justice
Stewart, in a dissenting opinion, declared, "The Framers . . .
lived at a time when the Old World still operated in the shadow of
ancient feudal traditions . . . . [Tihey set out to establish a soci-
ety that recognized no distinctions among white men on account
of their birth. ' 58 As authority for this proposition, Justice Stewart
cited the federal antinobility clause. 59 In Mathews v. Lucas,60 a
1976 case concerning illegitimate children's right to receive survi-
vors' insurance benefits, a dissenting opinion urged that the fed-
eral antinobility clause forbids economic distinctions based on
birth.6' Finally, in 1982, in Zobel v. Williams,62 four concurring
Justices invoked the clauses to disapprove Alaska's fiscal give-
away. In a footnote, Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and
Powell charged Alaska's degrees-of-citizenship approach with es-
tablishing a latter-day nobility, observing that "[t]he American
panded or a second dam built. At times, building a new dam will be the most eco-
nomical and effective solution. Because equal protection has expanded rapidly, has
attracted criticism as overextended, and was originally designed for another purpose,
the development of a new constitutional structure seems a better way of coming to
grips with state-created elites than does expanding current law.
53. See supra note 17.
54. See infra notes 79-90 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 91-100 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 57-63 and
accompanying text (dicta invoking antinobility clauses).
56. See infra notes 91-100 and accompanying text.
57. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
58. Id. at 531 n.13 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
59. Id The clause is reprinted supra note 17.
60. 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
61. Id. at 520 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
62. 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
[Vol. 32: 100
1984] DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
aversion to aristocracy developed long before the Fourteenth
Amendment and is ...reflected .. .in the Constitution. See
Art. I, § 9, cl. 8 ('No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the
United States')."
63
It thus appears that no clearly articulated doctrine limits gov-
ernmental discretion in the bestowal of favors and grants; that the
Supreme Court from time to time has behaved as though doctrine
exists; and that the antinobility clauses are possible sources for the
creation of explicit doctrine. If, as I believe, governmental enrich-
ment of favored groups is likely to increase, 64 then investigation of
the reach and application of these clauses is in order. Part II ex-
amines the history of the clauses in an effort to ascertain their core
meaning.
63. Id at 69 n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring).
64. This prediction is based on a number of things. First, I detect impatience
with the problems of the poor on the part of a segment of the American political elite,
a conviction that "now it's our turn." See Delgado, Words That Wound" A Tort Ac-
tion for Racial Insults, Epithets and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133,
135 n.12 (1982); Tumulty, Reagan Success: Curbing Social Spending, But Liberals,
Minorities Oppose Him on "Fairness"Issue, L.A. Times, Feb. 8, 1984, pt. I, at 1, col. 4.
Thus, although there has been a long-term trend toward equalization of wealth
in the United States, D. NORTH, GROWTH AND WELFARE IN THE AMERICAN PAST
166-67 (2d ed. 1974), this trend may be reversing itself. See infra text accompanying
notes 118-19, 194-211; R. REICH & I. MAGAZINER, MINDING AMERICA'S BUSINESS-
THE DECLINE AND RISE OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY (1982) (U.S. responded to
worldwide economic decline, in part by cutting social programs; U.S. expenditures for
social welfare among lowest of major industrialized nations); see also Special Issue,
The Richest People in America, FORBES, Fall 1983; Peters, supra note 11, at 6-7 (pub-
lisher of registry of titled British nobility will print series of directories devoted to "the
untitled [American] aristocracy," beginning with a volume on Texas); MacDougall,
Worldwide Inequality: Gap between Rich, Poor Is Widening, L.A. Times, Oct. 21,
1984, pt. I, at 1, col. 1; Crutsinger, America's Top 2% Hold 30% of the Wealth, Study
Finds, Philadelphia Inquirer, Oct. 10, 1984, at CI, col. I (federal study, in progress, of
distribution of U.S. wealth); Samuelson, Fashionable Fears Notwithstanding, the Mid-
dle Class is Not Vanishing, L.A. Times, Jan. 22, 1984, pt. IV, at 3, col. 3 (wealthiest
sector of population increasing its wealth vis-A-vis middle class and the poor; in par-
ticular, pretax income of wealthiest fifth of families "has reached levels not seen in
decades"); Kinsley, The Price of Equality." One Problem Ends, Another Begins, L.A.
Times, Dec. 27, 1983, pt. II, at 5, col. I ("Prosperity will look different next time...
there will be a wider spread of incomes. We are becoming a less equal society .. ";
author attributes this in part to current economic policies, which favor the rich); Kins-
ley, Few ofthe Rich Really Earned Their Status, L.A. Times, Oct. 12, 1983, pt. II, at 7,
col. 3; cf. Will, An American House ofLords, NEWSWEEK, June 4, 1984, at 92 ("This
country needs a homegrown peerage, which would be harmless without being use-
less.").
Any movement toward hierarchy could, of course, be greatly accelerated by se-
.lective distribution of biological commodities such as life extension, intelligence-en-
hancing potions, cloning services, and the like. See supra notes 9-10 and
accompanying text; infra notes 179-87 and accompanying text.
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II. THE ANTINOBILITY CLAUSES: ORIGINS AND CASE LAW
A. Early History
The antinobility clauses were part of an American reaction to
feudalism, a system of government and land tenure that still sur-
vived on the Continent. To understand the significance that the
early colonists placed on these clauses, it is helpful to understand
the basic elements of feudalism, the system against which they re-
belled. Feudalism was "a form of society ... [that] pushed to
extremes. . . the element of personal dependence. . . with a spe-
cialized military class occupying the higher levels in the social
scale; an extreme subdivision of the rights of real property ...
and a dispersal of political authority amongst a hierarchy of per-
sons .... "65
Under feudalism, vassals ("free men") provided services to
the lords in return for physical protection. 66 Over time, these rela-
tionships became hereditary. 67 Within the ruling class, the system
of obligations became complex, as superior kings and lords
granted titles and offices to those of lower rank in return for ser-
vice and loyalty.68 At the bottom of the hierarchy, the serfs
worked the land and remained tied to particular parcels of prop-
erty.69 Long before the American Revolution, the binding ele-
ment of English feudalism had shifted from military protection to
governmental status, as monarchs cemented relationships with
nobles and local gentry by offering them places in the English ad-
ministrative government.70 By the close of the seventeenth cen-
tury, "[p]olitics in England were. . . controlled by an oligarchy of
great landed nobles and country squires plus wealthy commercial
and banking families often related to the nobility."
'71
65. F. GANSHOF, FEUDALISM at xv (1964).
66. E.g., D. HAY, THE MEDIEVAL CENTURIES 38 (1964).
67. Id
68. Id at 38-41.
69. Id.
70. E.g., J. STRAYER, H. GATZKE & E. HARBISON, 1 THE COURSE OF CIVILIZA-
TION 352 (1961).
71. 2 T. WALLBANK, A. TAYLOR & G. CARSON, CIVILIZATION 36 (5th ed. 1965).
There were other differences between continental feudalism and English nobility. On
the Continent, the privileges and title of nobility were transmitted to all of a noble's
descendants in perpetuity. J. TASWELL-LANGMEAD, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL His-
TORY 153 (11 th ed. 1960). The privileges often included exemptions from taxes and
arrest, land rights, and a monopoly of military commissions. LORD MONTAGU OF
BEAULIEU, MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS 143-44 (1970). The English nobility enjoyed
few of these privileges; those they did retain were confined to one member of the
family at a time and passed to the eldest son. I F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 408-10 (2d ed. 1968); 2 id at 260; see also LORD
MONTAGU OF BEAULIEU, supra, at 143-44; Morris, Primogeniture and Entailed Estates
in America, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 24 (1927).
Although English peers lacked some of the privileges of their Continental coun-
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When the American colonies were first settled, the English
governors attempted to extend feudal relations there.72 The Eng-
lish monarchs considered land in America to be crown property
and granted fiefdoms to favored nobles. 73 At least one colonial
leader called for the creation of an American aristocracy, pat-
terned after that in England, in which power would be wielded by
wealthy individuals occupying seats in an American council like
the House of Lords.74 Others feared the colonists would not toler-
ate a permanent form of nobility and called for a modified nobil-
ity "for life."'
75
Those who supported the idea of an American nobility were
very much in the minority. Thomas Paine derided the English
monarchy for placing persons of little merit in positions of author-
ity.76 He called hereditary succession "an insult and imposition
on posterity" and declared that "all men being originally equals,
no one. . . could have a right to set up his own family in perpet-
ual preference to all others . . . . 77 Jefferson even opposed the
institution of fee tail in property law, believing that allowing fami-
lies to pass property "from generation to generation in the same
name" created a "Patrician order," devoted to royal interests. 78
The Framers agreed that the Constitution should prohibit ti-
tles of nobility. In the Federalist, Hamilton wrote:
Nothing need be said to illustrate the importance of the
prohibition of titles of nobility. This may truly be denominated
the comer stone of republican government; for so long as they
are excluded, there can never be serious danger that the gov-
ernment will be any other than that of the people. 79
Elsewhere, Madison saw the prohibition of nobility as perhaps the
"most decisive" proof of "the republican complexion of this sys-
terparts, they had significantly more political clout. LORD MONTAGU OF BEAULIEU,
supra, at 155 ("The peerage ... had few legal privileges, but no continental nobility
had anything like its political power.").
72. J. BASSETr, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 76 (2d ed. 1924).
73. Id
74. J. MILLER, ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 58 (1943). For a dis-
cussion of the history of early proposals to establish a feudal system in the colony of
Maryland, see L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 52-54 (1975); L. HARTZ,
THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA ch. 1 (1955).
75. B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 278
(1967).
76. T. PAINE, Common Sense, in SELECTIONS FROM THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
PAINE 13 (S. Mittell ed. 1935).
77. Id
78. T. JEFFERSON, Autobiography 1743-1790, in I THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 1, 49 (P. Ford ed. 1892). Primogeniture, the practice of leaving one's es-
tate to the oldest son, had been abandoned by several colonies even before the
Revolution and was abandoned by the rest shortly thereafter. L. FRIEDMAN, supra
note 74, at 57-58.
79. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 577-78 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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tem." 80 Another colonial writer defended the clauses against the
charge of ineffectuality since their predecessor in the Articles of
Confederation had not deterred the Cincinnati, an organization of
Revolutionary War officers, who allegedly were threatening to
make themselves into a nobility.8 ' The writer answered that the
antinobility clauses were "agreeable to the general sentiment of
the citizens" and that if the Cincinnati truly wanted to install
themselves as a form of nobility, a constitutional prohibition was
the best way to stop them.
82
The intensity of colonial opposition to nobility is indicated by
the controversy that arose in Congress over what title to bestow on
the office of President.8 3 The question arose when Congress was
drafting a reply to George Washington's inaugural address;
among the suggestions were "His Excellency" and even "His
Highness, the President of the United States and Protector of their
Liberties."84 The controversy raged for weeks in Congress and in
the newspapers. Some argued that the President needed an ex-
alted title to assure proper respect from other countries; others re-
plied that it violated the spirit of the new republic.85 Congress
finally addressed the reply "To the President of the United
States." 86
Against this background, the antinobility clauses evoked little
dissent.87 The Continental Congress incorporated a prohibition
against titles of nobility in every draft of the Articles of Confeder-
ation except the first. 88 The first draft of the Constitution circu-
lated at the Constitutional Convention provided that "[tlhe
United States shall not grant any title of nobility. ' 89 This portion
of the Constitution became law virtually without change. 90
80. Id No. 39, at 253 (J. Madison).
81. 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITU-
TION 373, 379, 390-91 (M. Jensen ed. 1978) (letter published in Connecticut Journal
in October 1787).
82. Id at 390.
83. S. BLOOM, HISTORY OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION UNDER THE CONSTI-
TUTION 373-82 (1935).
84. Id. at 375-76.
85. Id.
86. Id at 377-78. Some colonial leaders even urged George Washington to be a
king, a suggestion he quickly rejected. See, e.g., Equality, supra note 46, at 258.
87. DRAFTING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 711 (A. Prescott comp. 1941); 2 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 183 (M. Farrand ed. 1911) [here-
inafter cited as M. FARRAND].
88. 1 U.S. CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, SECRET JOURNALS OF THE ACTS AND PRO-
CEEDINGS 294, 305, 352 (1821) (Articles of Confederation).
89. DRAFTING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 87, at 706.
90. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. The Framers emphasized preserv-
ing equality of political access. The Constitution repeatedly refers to the political
equality of all citizens. The Preamble, for example, declares that "We the People of
the United States. . .do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States
[Vol. 3 2: 100
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B. Case Law
In addition to the Supreme Court dicta discussed earlier, a
number of lower court opinions have mentioned the antinobility
of America." "We the people" deliberately identified as the source of political power
the citizenry, rather than the states or, as in England, the King. See, e.g., 2 J. ELLIOT,
THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FED-
ERAL CONSTITUTION 434-35 (1941).
Elsewhere the document contains restrictions created to prevent persons from
becoming too powerful. Members of Congress are not permitted to hold offices in the
government simultaneously with their elected positions, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2,
and neither congressmen nor office holders can be appointed to the Electoral College,
id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. Each citizen is guaranteed all the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the other states. Id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. The fifth, sixth, and seventh amend-
ments give each citizen the right of due process and the right to trial by jury in crimi-
nal and certain civil suits.
Members of the House are elected "by the People," the qualifications for voting
in such an election being the same as those required to vote for the most numerous
branch of the state legislature. Id. art. I § 2, cl. 1. During the Constitutional Conven-
tion some suggested that the right to vote for Representatives should be restricted to
landowners, because landless persons might sell their votes. 2 M. FARRAND, supra
note 87, at 201-03. Franklin responded that it was important not to "depress the
virtue [and] public spirit of our common people," which had helped to win the war. 2
M. FARRAND, supra note 87, at 204. The motion was defeated by a vote of seven
states to one. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 87, at 206. Madison later proclaimed that
"[tihe electors are to be the great body of the people of the United States," the poor
and humble as well as the wealthy and distinguished. THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at
385 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). A motion to have senators elected by direct
vote by the people was defeated, however. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 87, at 151, 156.
Indirect election by the state legislature was recommended as affording "a convenient
link" between the state and federal systems, and as giving the states a direct role in
the formation of federal government. THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 416 (J. Madison)
(J. Cooke ed. 1961).
The Framers' concern for equality also shows in the minimal qualifications they
required of federal legislators. Members of the House of Representatives need only
be 25 years old, citizens for seven years, and state residents at the time of election.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. Senators must be 30 years old and citizens for nine
years. Id § 3, cl. 3. During the Convention, Charles Pickney, although opposed to"undue aristocratic influence," moved that property qualifications be established for
members of the federal branches to insure that those office holders were "independent
and respectable." 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 87, at 248. His suggestion was soundly
defeated. Id at 249.
Equality influenced the terms of office of the national legislature: two years for
representatives, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; six years for senators, id § 3, cl. 1. Ac-
cording to Madison, a relatively short term for representatives insured that officers"should have an immediate dependence on, [and] an intimate sympathy with the peo-
ple. Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy by which this dependence
and sympathy can be effectually secured." THE FEDERALIST No. 52, at 355 (J.
Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). The longer term for senators would provide stability
and consistency and permit the senators time to learn the affairs of state more fully.
Id. No. 62, at 418-20.
Many new state constitutions also contained provisions against inequality or spe-
cial privilege. See R. HARRIS, THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY 18-19 (1960). These polit-
ical provisions for grounding governmental power in "the people" and providing
against official privilege made clear that a noble class or caste was utterly alien to the
Founders' notion of government.
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clauses, and three have invoked them to invalidate or refuse state
action. In 1872, the Alabama legislature gave two named individ-
uals the right to operate a gaming business if they contributed to
the state's school fund. In Horst v. Moses,9 1 the Alabama
Supreme Court struck down the law in part for contravening the
state's antinobility clause. According to one justice, that clause
prohibits government from granting any privilege "to an order of
persons. . . at the expense of the rest of the people," even though
it is not hereditary or accompanied by a formal title.92 "[T]he ob-
jection . ..arises more from the privileges supposed to be at-
tached, than to the otherwise empty title or order."
93 Thus,
although the state might benefit a single property owner through
eminent domain or charter one corporation but not another,
94 it
could not make discriminations that are completely divorced from
the public good and intended only to enrich.
95
In Eskra v. Morton, an American Indian sought review of a
Board of Indian Affairs ruling that her illegitimacy would prevent
her from inheriting her mother's property. In a 1975 decision, the
Seventh Circuit reversed,96 noting that attachment of an official
stigma at birth would constitute a badge of ignobility, in contra-
vention of the nobility clauses.
97
A final decision, In re Jama,98 arose when a citizen applied to
a New York court to change his name from "Jama" to "von
Jama." The petitioner testified that his father had told him the
family name formerly was "von Jama" but that after immigrating
to the United States the family had dropped the prefix. He told
the court he wished to emphasize his Germanic heritage and that
without the prefix his friends and acquaintances assumed that he
was Slavic. The court rejected his request partly on antinobility
grounds. "True Americanism," the court declared, prohibits
any political divisions resting on race, religion or pigmentation
of skin. . . . "Von". . is a prefix occurring in many German
and Austrian names, especially of the nobility. The court can-
not think of a greater nobility than being an American ....
This is the law of the land and declaratory for our own public
91. 48 Ala. 129 (1872), writ dismissed, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 387 (1872).
92. Id. at 142.
93. Id. The court went on to say that the antinobility clauses "preserve the
equality of the citizens in respect to their public and private rights."
94. Id. at 142-43.
95. Id at 143-44 (such discrimination violates not only the antinobility clauses,
but "natural law" as well).
96. 524 F.2d 9 (7th Cir. 1975).
97. Id at 13 n.8. The court also held the discrimination violated the equal pro-
tection clause. Id. at 13-14.




The court rejected the petitioner's arguments as "puerile, if not
pathetic." 00
C. Summary and Proposed Test
Constitutional history indicates the Framers intended the
clauses to forbid the award of actual titles of nobility, as well as
governmental creation of elite classes with unique material advan-
tages and privileged political access. As such, the clauses re-
sponded to a deeply felt revolutionary ideal: that before the
government, at least, all citizens were to count as equals. Three
courts have invoked the clauses directly as grounds of decision.
Although one of the decisions seems aberrant,10' the other two are
less easily dismissed. Finally, the Supreme Court has mentioned
the clauses in a number of dissenting or concurring opinions, most
recently in 1982.102 Combining the constitutional history, case
law, and Supreme Court dicta yields criteria for determining
when the clauses have been violated, as well as a set of ancillary
policies for use in borderline cases. Under the proposed test, a
court will find state action unconstitutional if it
1. Confers an actual title of nobility, or
2. Confers all or many of the following indices of nobility:
(a) significant and enduring advantages of wealth and
political influence;
(b) significant and enduring advantages with respect to
the exercise of basic human faculties, especially those concerned
with speech and thought; 10 3
(c) perception by others as special or superior;
(d) membership in a "closed" class, i.e., one that will re-
sist entry by outsiders regardless of merit.1'4
The criteria mirror, to some extent, those for strict review
under Carolene Products "footnote four" reasoning, 10 5 although
99. Id at 10, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 678.
100. Id at 10, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 678. The vehemence of the court's language seems
odd, given that Mr. Jama stood to gain no material or political advantage from
changing his name. At issue was solely his desire to possess an aristocratic-sounding
name.
101. See supra note 100.
102. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
103. See Insemination, supra note 9; Reproduction, supra note 9. Both commenta-
ries argue that creation of biological elites violates the spirit of antinobility clauses-
that the Framers would have regarded such programs as unconstitutional had they
foreseen them.
104. Requirements 2(a), 2(b), and 2(d) create, in effect, an "irreversibility"
criterion.
105. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (implying
strict review appropriate for laws that impair political processes or single out mem-
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their application will of course differ. In close cases, courts may
advert to a group of subsidiary concerns that, while not central to
the Framers' intentions, nevertheless played a role in the discus-
sion that led up to the clauses' enactment. These additional con-
cerns include: encouraging political diversity; preventing
demoralization of the populace; guarding against corruption of
those unfairly enriched; and preserving upward mobility and en-
trepreneurial spirit.
10 6
Just as they protect the disenfranchised, I0 7 legislatures could
enact measures to prevent establishment of the super-en-
franchised. Nobility itself then would be prohibited directly by
the Constitution, while enumerated "badges and incidents of no-
bility" would be prohibited by statute. 08
Courts presumably would apply a strict standard of review to
bers of discrete and insular minorities for unfavorable treatment). Other authorities
have added the elements of stigma and immutability, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973); Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE
L.J. 421, 424 (1960); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV.
1065, 1127 (1969).
The proposed criteria for nobility are triggered when state action creates a group
that evidences three reverse characteristics-viz., it receives favorable (not unfavora-
ble) treatment, it is seen as ennobled (not stigmatized), and it is politically powerful
(not impotent)-and two characteristics in common (insularity and permanence) with
groups that currently receive heightened judicial protection.
When state action ennobles at the expense of blacks or other suspect classes, my
test should combine with current equal protection doctrine to yield an even higher
level of judicial scrutiny than is available under existing doctrine.
106. J. GARDINER, An Oration, Delivered July 4, 1785, at the Request of the In-
habitants of the Town of Boston, in CELEBRATION OF THE ANNIVERSARY OF AMERI-
CAN INDEPENDENCE 13 (Boston 1785); T. NORTON, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 89 (1922); M. PETERSON, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE NEW NA-
TION 113-14 (1970); 1 K. ROWLAND, THE LIFE OF CHARLES CARROLL OF CARROLL-
TON 247 (1898); G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787,
at 73 (1969); Lobsenz, Bakke, Lochner and Law School" The New Nobility Clause
versus a Republican Form of Medicine, 32 ME. L. REV. 1, 13 (1980) (quoting George
Clinton's remark that colonists' attitude toward aristocracy was one of intense "spirit
of resentment"). Hamilton also warned that concentrating the power to make ap-
pointments to offices in a small group could be used to dominate the rest of the gov-
ernment (as occurred in England, see supra notes 65-78 and accompanying text). THE
FEDERALIST No. 77, at 518-19 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961); see infra notes
201-03 and accompanying text. For an indication that some of these antinobility
concerns retain their vitality, see Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321, 2330
(1984) (upholding power of state to redistribute land held pursuant to feudal scheme
established by early Polynesian monarchs: "The people of Hawaii have attempted,
much as the settlers of the original 13 Colonies did, to reduce the perceived social and
economic evils of a land oligarchy traceable to their monarchs . . . . Regulating oli-
gopoly and the evils associated with it is a classic exercise of a State's police
powers.").
107. See D. BELL, supra note 15 (discussing civil rights legislation enacted under
thirteenth and fourteenth amendments).
108. See infra Part VB; see also infra notes 188-192 and accompanying text (fur-
ther discussion of use of the clauses in sustaining antinobility legislation).
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challenges brought under the clauses. 109 The constitutional prohi-
bition is absolute, 0 and the judicial decisions and dicta interpret-
ing the clauses have treated them as stating an absolute or near-
absolute standard.' As a corollary, governmental action that vi-
olates the criteria of nobility would be required to meet a "least
ennobling alternative" test: that government cannot achieve its
objective by means less offensive to the clauses and their values.
A later section of this Article illustrates analysis under the
proposed test by applying the criteria to a number of hypothetical
and actual cases. First, however, the Article considers reasons
why the clauses should be revived and some likely objections to
their revival.
III. REASONS FOR REVITALIZING THE ANTINOBILITY CLAUSES
Revitalizing the antinobility clauses offers a number of doc-
trinal advantages: The clauses can unify and explain the other-
wise anomalous decisions described in Part I;'1 2 they offer a
symmetrical counterpart to constitutional doctrine aimed at pro-
tecting the disadvantaged;" t3 and they provide a textually
grounded constitutional norm, under which courts would develop
case law aimed at preventing certain types of evil. 14 Assigning an
explicit role to the clauses would lessen the likelihood that courts
will sporadically and unpredictably invalidate legislation because
it offends unstated preferences." 15
History and political theory also support revitalization. Until
recently, American society has not needed doctrine to curb enno-
blement. The principal dangers to equality were attitudes and
practices that ruthlessly subjugated Blacks, Hispanics, Indians,
109. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
110. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 ("No Title of Nobility shall begranted"); id § 10 ("No
State shall... grant any Title of Nobility") (emphasis added). A strongly ennobling
effect should be enough to trigger the test; proof of intent should not be necessary.
See supra notes 39-42, 57-63, 91-97 and accompanying text (cases and dicta finding
violation of antinobility clause in absence of explicit intent to ennoble); supra notes
76-86 and accompanying text (framers opposed institution of nobility because of its
pernicious effects on representative government).
111. See supra notes 57-63, 91-100 and accompanying text. The cases are devoid
of any "balancing" as occurs under the standard applied in connection with most
constitutional rights.
112. See supra notes 31-42 and accompanying text. For example, the Illinois stat-
ute in Doud would be seen as creating a permanent, closed class with significant ad-
vantages and a legislative imprimatur of superiority, while conferring on the class a
valuable material benefit.
113. See supra note 105.
114. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
115. This was one of the main reasons for sharply reducing judicial supervision of




women, and the poor."16 Civil rights legislation and changes in
national consciousness have begun to reduce the magnitude of
these threats. 1 7 The principal danger to a just society today may
no longer be deliberate, systematic oppression of those at the bot-
tom of the social heap, but purposeful enrichment of those at the
top coupled with indifference to the rest." 8 With a stagnant or
slow-growing economy, it is no longer necessary to oppress the
underclass to maintain a sharp cleavage betwen the haves and the
have-nots; instituting arrangements that preserve and nurture
privilege will serve." l9 Moral and political intuitions hold that
nonmerit-based social stratification is undesirable. 120 Legal doc-
trine should evolve accordingly.12'
The principal alternatives to the antinobility clauses for
preventing state-created nobility are either ineffectual or costly.
Inaction only allows increasing hierarchy to become entrenched.
Civil insurrection is implausible. Challenges could be brought
under the equal protection and due process clauses or the public
purpose doctrine, but as was observed earlier, they are unlikely to
116. See D. BELL, supra note 15; Black, supra note 105.
117. D. BELL, supra note 15 (legislation and case law aimed at curbing external
manifestations of discrimination).
118. See infra notes 201-15 and accompanying text (growing governmental indif-
ference to the poor and minorities); see also N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 1970, at 1, col. 5
(Nixon's adviser Daniel Patrick Moynihan calls for "benign neglect" of civil rights
issues).
119. See R. REICH & I. MAGAZINER, supra note 64; cf. Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States, 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2028 (1983) ("When the Government grants exemptions or
allows deductions all taxpayers are affected; the very fact of the exemption or deduc-
tion for the donor means that other taxpayers can be said to be indirect and vicarious
'donors.' ").
120. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV (forbidding slavery, requiring equal pro-
tection of the laws); The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("We hold
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal. ... ); supra notes
76-90 and accompanying text. But see P. EIDELBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 251-53 (1968) (framers counted on conservative elements
of the new government, plus constitutional protection of private property, to protect
rule by wealthy).
121. When an outside force threatens equality, a major ordering principle of our
political system, the law should be ingenious about fashioning a remedy. When an-
timonopolistic legislation first was proposed, for example, the evils of price-fixing and
other anticompetitive activities must have been obvious. But the idea that federal
legislation could redress these evils must have seemed at first implausible. Antitrust
and antinobility values seek both to curb undesirable concentrations of power and to
maintain a free market of goods or of social-political contributions. The willingness
of courts and legislators to construe a broad grant of power under the commerce
clause to sustain antitrust legislation, e.g., McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232
(1980); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 286 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting), suggests
that a similar construction might sustain antitrust's social-political counterpart, the
prohibition of nobility. See also Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964)
(governmental engagement in creating system of licenses, subsidies, and other benefits
triggers need for new legal protections).
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succeed. 122 A political solution, "voting the rascals out," is too
uncertain-any class satisfying the test for nobility could manipu-
late politics and public opinion decisively; 123 moreover, its mem-
bers' advantages might easily come to be seen, over time, as
natural or deserved.1
24
Finally, legal protection of political and social equality is ex-
panding' 125 Since the antinobility clauses are aimed at protecting
against one kind of inequality, the case for revitalization gains
strength from currents already in motion in the areas of equality
and equal protection. One area, with significant ties to the anti-
nobility principle, where this expansion can be seen is the "one
man-one vote" controversy over congressional redistricting. In
Wesberry v. Sanders,126 the Supreme Court considered a challenge
to a Georgia congressional district that was over twice as large as
the average district in that state. The Court held that Article I
section 2 requires that "as nearly as is practicable one man's vote
. . . is to be worth as much as another's."' 27 After reviewing the
article's history, the Court justified its decision through the Fram-
ers' concern for election "by the People." The Court reasoned
that permitting state legislators to create unbalanced congressional
voting districts would defeat the Framers' intent: "The House of
Representatives . . . was to represent the people as individuals,
and on a basis of complete equality for each voter."'
128
Five years later, the Court showed how serious it was about
upholding this principle. In Kirkpatrick v. Preisler,129 the Court
122. See supra note 47 (political and economic theorists find broad tolerance for
nest-feathering behavior by official bodies). Moreover, without a fundamental inter-
est or a suspect or quasi-suspect class, the equal protection standard of review is
"mere rationality," with maximum judicial deference given to the legislature. See,
e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955); United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 (1938); see also Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating, under substantive due process clause, maximum hours
legislation for bakers). Lochner ushered in the era of substantive due process. The
current Court decisively has abandoned this position. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144
(1938); L. TRIBE, supra note 7, at 442-55.
123. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text (criteria for antinobility
clauses); C.W. MILLS, supra note 14; CHILDS, Pressure Groups and Propaganda, in
THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCENE 205 (E. Logan ed. 1936); Wright, Politics and the
Constitution. Is Money Speech, 85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976); Now Is the Time For Al
Good Men. TIME, Jan. 5, 1968, at 44.
124. See sources cited supra notes 103-04, 123.
125. See infra notes 126-42 and accompanying text. But see supra note 52 and
accompanying text (equal protection unlikely to expand sufficiently to take account of
state created elites).
126. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
127. Id at 7-8.
128. Id at 14.
129. 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
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held that the "as nearly as practicable" standard required states to
try to achieve actual mathematical equality. 30 Wesberry and
Preisler, then, indicate that, at least in this context, the Court
views equality as a precise, achievable concept, not just an idle
dream or goal. The antinobility clauses, too, are aimed at achiev-
ing equality of political access. Where official ennoblement
threatens this value, similar grounds for concern arise.
At the end of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court had
distinguished between political equality, guaranteed by the Con-
stitution, and social equality, which received no constitutional
protection. In Plessy v. Ferguson,131 the Court upheld a Louisiana
statute requiring separate but equal railway accommodations for
blacks and whites. Any inequality arising from such arrange-
ments, the Court reasoned, was not forbidden by the Constitution,
which could not challenge "the general sentiment of the commu-
nity" concerning blacks' social inferiority. 132 Justice Harlan vig-
orously dissented, urging that "in view of the Constitution ...
there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citi-
zens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of
civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law."' 33
Brown v. Board of Education134 later vindicated Harlan's
view. Since Brown, the Supreme Court has used the fourteenth
amendment to eliminate many remaining vestiges of state-im-
posed social inequality. 35 A theme running through post-Brown
cases is that denial of social rights leads to unacceptable stigmati-
zation and, ultimately, a caste system. In this respect the Supreme
Court has considerably surpassed the colonial intention.
36
Case law and commentary have strengthened or urged equal
protection for newly recognized groups, such as women, 137 illegiti-
mates, 38 aliens, 139 the young, 140 and homosexuals. 141 The contin-
130. Id. at 531-32.
131. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
132. Id. at 551 (quoting People v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438, 448 (1883)).
133. Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
134. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
135. Soon after Brown, the Supreme Court enjoined segregation in other public
facilities. E.g., Schiro v. Bynum, 375 U.S. 395 (1964) (municipal auditorium); Gayle
v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (city buses); Mayor & City Council v. Dawson, 350
U.S. 877 (1955) (public beaches and bath houses).
136. Although the colonists objected to a formal, systematic establishment of no-
.bility, many of them had no objection to the exclusion of women, slaves, Indians, or
adherents of nonconforming religions from full social membership. Equality, supra
note 46, at 252-54, 267-69.
137. Eg., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
138. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Levy v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 68 (1968).
139. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Takahashi v. Fish & Game
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uing vitality of equal protection suggests that the antinobility
clauses, which protect similar values, may be ready for
expansion. 1
42
IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST REVITALIZING THE ANTINOBILITY
CLAUSES
Several objections could be raised to an antinobility attack on
governmentally created elites. One might argue that antinobility
analysis could be used to strike down practically every govern-
mental action or program, that it would require affirmative obli-
gations on behalf of the poor, and that it could not be effectuated
by courts or any other branch of government.
The objection that antinobility analysis would sweep too far
does not seem serious. Invalidation requires extreme, systematic
favoritism; 143 programs that aid particular persons, industries, or
geographical regions only moderately would not fall within the
clauses' reach. 144 Programs that confer substantial benefits, but
on a one-time-only, nonperpetuating basis (like patents), would
likewise not be reached.145 A similar line-drawing difficulty arises
with nobility's opposites: slavery and takings. At its core, human
slavery is easily recognized and morally condemned, as is uncom-
Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948). But see
Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (state law may exclude aliens from service as
state troopers, who perform a governmental function).
140. See L. TRIBE, supra note 7, § 16-29 (discussing possibility that young are a
suspect class).
141. See Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges.- The Legal Position of Homosexual
Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799 (1979).
142. E.g., Equality, supra note 46, at 245-46, 272-80 (pointing out that each expan-
sion of political rights has been accompanied by rhetoric of equality); see also Fiss,
The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword" The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV.
1, 11-17 (1979) (judiciary's role in articulating "public values"). But see supra note 52
and accompanying text (equality-protecting doctrine, although rigorous, unlikely to
be able to expand to handle antinobility concerns).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 103-05.
144. Thus, a decision to build a bridge or military installation in one community
rather than another, to award a construction contract to one firm rather than another,
or to rescue one troubled industry but not another, would be insufficient to trigger
nobility clause concerns. Nor would most "private bills," or congressional or presi-
dential awards and medals trigger those concerns. A governmental decision to clone
leading scientists probably would do so. See infra text accompanying notes 179-85.
145. These programs would not meet criteria 2(a), 2(b), and 2(d). See supra text
accompanying notes 103-04; cf. D. HAGMAN & D. MISCZYNSKI, WINDFALLS FOR
WIPEOUTS: LAND VALUE, CAPTURE, AND COMPENSATION (1978) (proposing that
persons and industries that benefit from governmental programs that enhance land
value be required to pay compensation for this benefit). But see J. POLE, THE PUR-
SUIT OF EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 145 (1978) (Andrew Jackson vetoed bill to
charter the United States Bank on ground that our political traditions forbade "titles,




pensated governmental confiscation of property. Both areas pres-
ent, at their fringes, close cases (Is the baseball draft slavery? Is a
governmental zoning regulation that impairs the value of private
property a taking?).
But vagueness and uncertainty at the periphery 46 have not
deterred us from enacting a system of simply stated rules aimed at
core evils. No one believes that the thirteenth amendment and the
takings clause do not belong in the Constitution; the only ques-
tions concern their outermost bounds. The same trade-off should
be made in the case of nobility: The benefits we derive from a
general rule prohibiting nobility make uncertainty over difficult
cases 147 acceptable. Judicial experience can fill in the principle's
exact boundaries.
A second objection is that the antinobility clauses might re-
quire the government to undertake affirmative obligations toward
the poor. To equalize opportunity and access to resources, might
not the government be compelled to recognize the "right" of every
citizen to health services, education, and other commodities neces-
sary to social mobility? No; the antinobility clauses would be trig-
gered only if the government distributed these commodities so
inequitably as to satisfy the proposed test for ennoblement.148 No
prohibition would arise if the government did not distribute the
commodity at all (for example, by leaving distribution to the pri-
vate market) or distributed it evenhandedly. The antinobility
clauses would prevent the government only from concentrating
power and resources in an elite class. They would neither require
nor prevent governmental efforts to aid the poor.
A final group of objections center on the idea that even if a
violation of the antinobility clauses were shown, no decision-
maker could order relief. Courts could not hear complaints, it
might be argued, because of problems of standing, separation of
powers, and political questions. These hurdles aside, the judiciary
surely is in no mood to invent what would in effect be a new fun-
146. See Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328 (1916) (public work on roads and bridges
not slavery); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897) (seamen's contracts not slav-
ery); United States v. Crocker, 420 F.2d 307 (8th Cir. 1970) (military draft not slav-
ery); State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441 (1966) (court order that attorney
represent an indigent not slavery); see also Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944)
(finding illegitimate peonage in state statute); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911)
(same); Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (baseball draft not slavery),
afl'd, 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1971), aft'd, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
147. See Titles of Nobility, supra note 9 (considering whether federal veteran's
preference for civil service positions amounts to establishment of nobility).
148. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text (proposed criteria for anti-
nobility clauses). This conclusion avoids a "ratchet" effect, in which entitlements to
the poor, once enacted, can never be abolished. Under the proposed test they may be
abolished, but not in a manner that creates a noble class elsewhere in society.
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damental interest. Moreover, a complaint taken to Congress or
the executive branch, the very arms of government charged with
the violation, would be futile.
It would be a mistake to dismiss too quickly the idea that
legislatures or executives might abolish a badge or incident of no-
bility called to their attention. As Paul Brest has pointed out,' 4 9
legislatures as well as courts are responsible for protecting consti-
tutional values. When weighing legislation, they must indepen-
dently determine whether it meets constitutional standards; they
should not abdicate this responsibility with the excuse that "the
courts will decide." Once Brest's "conscientious legislator" be-
comes aware that proposed legislation will offend antinobility val-
ues, he or she should be presumed to oppose it. Thus, even if
courts declined to hear challenges based on the clauses, a coordi-
nate arm of government might not. The Constitution preserves
the right "to petition the Government for a redress of griev-
ances."' 150 The more that prudential and institutional-competence
questions militate against judicial determination of a question, the
stronger the case becomes for direct petition to another arm of
government.
Allegations of exclusion or demoralization will establish a pe-
titioner's standing.151 Either allegation would satisfy the require-
ment of injury in fact, and judicial relief will alleviate the harm. 152
Separation of powers and the political nature of relief raise closer
questions. The political question doctrine renders nonjusticiable
matters that the Constitution expressly relegates to another branch
of government, that lack judicially manageable standards, or that
invade the province of a coordinate branch of government. 153
The last-mentioned requirement is an aspect of separation of pow-
ers; it assures that courts do not assume a power so great as to
"obliterate the division between judicial authority and legislative
149. Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27
STAN. L. REV. 585 (1975).
150. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
151. "Injury in fact" is the principal standing requirement in nontaxpayer suits,
e.g., Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972); Association of
Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970) (injury may be aesthetic
or spiritual); L. TRIBE, supra note 7, § 3-19.
152. The plaintiff also must show "an injury to himself that is likely to be re-
dressed by a favorable decision." Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426
U.S. 26, 38 (1976); L. TRIBE, supra note 7, § 3-21. If courts found standing an obsta-
cle, Congress could provide for standing by legislation, thus giving courts maximum
power to hear cases under article III. See Varat, Variable Justiciablity and the Duke
Power Case, 58 TEX. L. REV. 273 (1980).
153. E.g., Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962); Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948); L.
TRIBE, supra note 7, § 3-16.
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power .... ,1114 Since constitutional history and case law, re-
viewed earlier, do provide standards and since the Constitution
does not expressly relegate antinobility concerns to another arm of
government, 15 5 the main political question issue would be whether
judicial determination of antinobility claims would impermissibly
encroach on legislative or executive freedom of action.
To assess encroachment, courts have considered whether ju-
dicial resolution will embarrass another arm of government, con-
fuse national policy, frustrate democratic decision-making, or
exhaust a court's political capital unnecessarily. 5 6 But the core
question is judicial competence: a court's ability to translate a
constitutional principle into enforceable rights. 157 It is not easy to
generalize about how courts would view antinobility claims under
this standard. Certainly, many such claims will not require the
courts to venture into areas where they have no expertise, 158 like
foreign relations'59 or military training. 160 Nor would review be
"essentially standardless"; 161 reasonably precise guidelines may be
drawn.162 When an antinobility claim seeks to restructure society
in ways beyond a court's competence, 163 the court should decline
to hear it. 164
An objection might be raised that reinvigorated antinobility
clauses would amount, in effect, to a new fundamental interest. 165
Antinobility is not a novel interest. It has been in the Constitution
all along; it simply has found few nontrivial applications until
lately. 166 A restrained view of courts' role would, if anything, sup-
154. Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 142 (1912).
155. See supra notes 65-100 and accompanying text.
156. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); see Scharpf, Judicial Review and the
Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 566-83 (1966); Tigar,
Judicial Power, the "Political Question Doctrine, " and Foreign Relations, 17 UCLA L.
REV. 1135 (1970).
157. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226
(1962); L. TRIBE, supra note 7, § 3-16, at 73-79.
158. See infra text accompanying notes 179-87 (hypothetical program to clone
leading citizens, assessment of which is well within judicial expertise).
159. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416 (1964); L. TRIBE,
supra note 7, § 3-16, at 76 n.35.
160. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
161. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962); L. TRIBE, supra note 7, § 3-16, at
78-79.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 65-100 (history and case law of anti-
nobility clauses); text accompanying notes 103-05 (criteria for applying clauses).
163. See infra text accompanying notes 212-15 (challenge to Reagan administra-
tion's program of "supply side" economics).
164. In such a case, the claim may be taken to another branch of government. See
supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
165. The current Supreme Court seems unlikely to invent new fundamental inter-
ests. See L. TRIBE, supra note 7, § 16-30 to -31; Gunther, supra note 52.
166. See supra notes 91-100 and accompanying text (cases using antinobility law
to invalidate gaming license and inheritance prohibition, and to refuse a name
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port use of these clauses in appropriate cases. They are, after all,
found in the text of the Constitution, unlike the right of privacy,
the right to interstate travel, and the right to vote, recent creations
of judicial activism not expressly grounded in the Constitution.167
V. ILLUSTRATIONS OF ANTINOBILITY CLAUSE ANALYSIS
Antinobility analysis could be used in three ways: to strike
down legislation that establishes nobility, to support legislation
aimed at reducing nobility, or to spur nonjudicial reform of pro-
grams that offend the values and policies of the clauses.
A. Antinobility Clauses Applied to Strike Down State Action
Antinobility analysis would have led a court to invalidate
both the Alaskan distributional scheme in Zobel v. Williams168
and the Louisiana provisions for the selection of river pilots in
Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Commissioners. 169 The Alaskan
scheme established a set of permanent, closed classes whose mem-
bers would receive a substantial monetary benefit. 70 The distri-
bution marked the "old timers" as superior to the newcomers, a
superiority that might easily confer an edge in state politics.' 7'
These features gave the Alaskan program, in the view of four
Supreme Court Justices, an unacceptable ring of nobility. 72
Although the Court struck down the scheme on equal protection
grounds, the same result could have been achieved under the anti-
nobility clauses.
In the face of an equal protection challenge, Kotch upheld a
Louisiana law that antinobility analysis would have struck down.
The state's scheme to select river pilots resulted in virtually hered-
itary occupation of desirable jobs. 173 The class was narrow-the
only way to become a river pilot was to belong to a small circle of
change). But see supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text (four justices would use
antinobility analysis to invalidate Alaskan surplus distribution).
167. Eg., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to abortion); Oregon v. Mitch-
ell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (right to vote); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S.
621 (1969) (fight to vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to welfare
without fulfilling residency requirements); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S.
500 (1964) (rights to interstate, international travel protected); Gerety, Redefining Pri-
vacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233 (1977).
168. 457 U.S. 55 (1982), discussed supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
169. 330 U.S. 552 (1947), discussed supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
170. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
171. People in thinly populated, rural communities look favorably on long-term
residence and suspiciously on recent arrival. The Alaska program would put an offi-
cial imprimatur on those attitudes.
172. 457 U.S. at 69 n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Marshall, Justice Black-
mun, and Justice Powell joined the concurring opinion.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
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family or friends. 74 Especially if (as seems likely) river pilots
wield influence in local and state politics, the Louisiana practice
fulfilled the requirements of nobility and should have been found
to be unconstitutional.
175
Aorey v. Doud 76 presents a closer case. The Supreme
Court's first instincts about the case seem at least partly correct:
American Express' monopoly constituted a permanent commer-
cial benefit and established a closed class. Still, American Express
is a corporation, not a natural person, 177 and its monopoly did not
confer a unique entree into politics. Antinobility analysis would
not, therefore, have saved Doud from overruling.
178
An easier case is presented by a hypothetical state program to
distribute biological benefits. Projected or developing technolo-
gies may some day enable humans to extend their lives by many
years, 179 preselect their children's characteristics, 180 clone organ
systems or entire bodies,18 and enjoy artificially enhanced intelli-
gence and vigor. 182  Currently, the wealthy disproportionately
174. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
175. Kotch thus illustrates a divergence between equal protection and antinobility
clause analysis. The distribution scheme in Kotch is vulnerable to an antinobility
clause attack, yet invulnerable to attack under equal protection. Under current law,
the Court reached the right result; there was no suspect class or fundamental interest
in Kotch, and the scheme probably met the requirement of minimum rationality.
Equal protection does not explain what is wrong with the Kotch scheme; only the
antinobility clause does.
176. 354 U.S. 457 (1957), overruled, City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 247,
306 (1976) (per curiam), discussed supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
177. An ennobled corporation seems alien to the framers' intention and ordinary
intuitions. True, the American Express shareholders stood to benefit from the corpo-
ration's favored treatment, and the directors and managers would gain freedom from
regulation. These considerations make Douda close case but ultimately do not, in my
opinion, justify invalidation of the law. See supra notes 143-47 and accompanying
text (line-drawing difficulties).
178. Although equal protection and antinobility analysis might reach the same
result, i e., upholding the scheme in Doud, they do so by significantly different routes.
Under standard equal protection analysis, Doudis an easy case, in which the scheme
should be upheld. Favoritism to American Express is not based on a suspect class
and does not implicate a fundamental interest. Moreover, it arguably meets the re-
quirements of minimum rationality. Under the antinobility clause, the case is much
closer; the scheme is upheld only by virtue of American Express' corporate status and
the absence of any political advantage conferred by the gift. See supra note 177 and
accompanying text.
179. LIFE SPAN: VALUES AND LIFE-EXTENDING TECHNOLOGIES (R. Veatch ed.
1979); Regulating an Anti-Aging Drug, 8 HASTINGS CENT. REP. 19 (June 1978); Im-
mortality Through Science PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Aug. 1983, at 40-41; Organs
Needed, But Not When Sold, 124 Sci. NEWS 328 (Nov. 19, 1983) (hearing convened by
Sen. Albert Gore to discuss legislation forbidding sale of body parts).
180. M. SHAPIRO & R. SPECE, CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS ON BIOETHICS
AND LAW 326-567 (1981).
181. Id. at 46-67, 373-76, 391-93, 416-20.
182. Eg., Brain Healing." Implanting Fetal Cells in Rats, TIME, Aug. 8, 1983, at 59;
Jarvik, Effects of Chemical and Physical Treatments on Learning and Memory, 23 ANN.
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consume medical care, 83 a situation our society tolerates because
it results from ordinary market forces and does not contribute
greatly to social stratification-some poor persons enjoy good
health and physical vigor despite minimal health care, while some
wealthy persons, despite the best of care, are sickly and die young.
When first developed, the potent life- and faculty-enhancing
commodities mentioned above will probably be more scarce and
expensive than ordinary medical care is today. 184 If similarly dis-
tributed according to pre-existing wealth, however, they have the
potential to produce a rapid, drastic, and probably irreversible
widening of the gap between society's haves and have-nots. 85
Public opinion will probably resist private development and
sale, 186 yet governmental participation would expose the state to
charges that it is establishing nobility. The beneficiaries would
receive a substantial and much-desired benefit, the effects may be
long-lasting, and the recipients could come to be viewed as natu-
rally and deservedly superior. If their advantages include intelli-
gence, vigor, and other "merit" attributes, they would have easy
access to politics and political influence. Unless precautions were
taken, the class could become closed: Those who received the ini-
tial benefit could obtain further enhancements for themselves and
their children and prevent others from doing so. To avoid estab-
lishing nobility, as well as irreversibly harming concepts of equal-
ity, social mobility, and the uniqueness of the individual, novel
REV. PSYCHOLOGY 457, 478 (1972); McGaugh, Drug Facilitation of Learning and
Memory, 13 ANN. REV. PHARMACOLOGY 229, 232 (1973); Almond, Cart & Harvey,
supra note 10, at col. 2 (growth hormone used by professional and amateur athletes to
improve performance).
183. Rosenblatt, Health Care Reform and Administrative Law: A Structural Ap-
proach, 88 YALE L.J. 243, 244-46 (1978); Shapiro, Who Merits Merit? Problems in
Distributive Justice and Utility Posed by the New Biology, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 318,
341-47 (1974).
184. M. SHAPIRO & R. SPECE, supra note 180, at 829-53; Nelson, Bionic Man.: In
Search of New Parts, L.A. Times, Nov. 30, 1983, pt. I, at 1, col. I (high cost of newly
developed and projected artificial bodily parts, including intraocular lenses, vascular
grafts and valves, hip joints, pacemakers, breasts, knee joints, finger joints,
hydrocephalic shunts, bone growth stimulators, cochiae, skin, hearts and heart parts,
penile implants, ureters, sphincters, pancreata, ear parts, tendons, ligaments, and bone
and blood substitutes).
185. Shapiro, supra note 183, at 344-45 (certain biological traits, such as intelli-
gence, energy, imagination, and long life, are "resource attractors," whose possession
"leads to still more resource-attractive powers, the cycle spiraling upward indefi-
nitely"); see id at 345-47 ("merit attributes" serve as resource attractors). Selective
distribution of resource attractors can lead to biological elites and extreme social
stratification. Id at 353-57.
186. E.g., Plan to Sell Kidneys, supra note 10 (furor when private entrepreneur
disclosed his plan to buy and sell organs for transplanting); sources cited supra note
10; see also M. SHAPIRO & R. SPECE, supra note 180, at 754-69; Reproduction, supra
note 9, at 544-45.
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modes of distribution would need to be explored.
187
B. Antinobility Clauses Applied to Support Legislation
The antinobility clauses do not reach private action, nor do
they contain language expressly authorizing Congress to enact im-
plementing legislation. Still, the clauses' history evidences a thor-
oughgoing constitutional aversion to government by self-
perpetuating elites.' 88 To supplement their negative command-
ment, Congress or state legislatures might enact positive legisla-
tion, relying on the authority of a constitutional principle, such as
equal protection or the commerce clause, that does allow imple-
mentation. 189 For example, legislation might prohibit political
donations larger than a certain amount or a candidate's contribut-
ing more than a certain figure to his or her own campaign.'
90 In
187. For example, any distribution could be delayed until all may benefit. Alter-
natively, benefits could be given only to naturally disadvantaged persons, and the
benefit could be confined to bringing them near the societal average. Or benefits
could create super-human beings, on condition that those so blessed donate the prod-
uct of their labors to the public good. See generally Shapiro, supra note 183, at
337-44; cf Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (quidpro quo justifica-
tion for involuntary mental commitment).
This assumes that the technologies have been developed, with the only question
being the manner in which their benefits are distributed. Any effort to regulate the
development of the technologies probably would contravene first amendment rights of
the researchers. See Delgado, Bradley, Burkenroad, Chavez, Doering, Lardiere,
Reeves, Smith & Windhausen, Can Science Be Inopportune? Constitutional Validity of
Governmental Restrictions on Race-IQ Research, 31 UCLA L. REV. 128 (1983); Del-
gado & Millen, God, Galileo, and Government: Toward Constitutional Protectionfor
Scientflc Inquiry, 53 WASH. L. REV. 349 (1978). It should be noted that the search for
alternative methods of distribution is required by antinobility clause concerns but not
by standard equal protection analysis. Giving these biological goods only to those
who can pay for them would probably not violate equal protection; wealth is not a
suspect classification, San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973), and there is no fundamental right to receive medical treatment. Nor does
distribution of scarce resources on the basis of ability to pay offend the requirements
of minimum rationality.
188. See supra notes 65-90 and accompanying text.
189. The thirteenth and fourteenth amendments confer explicit power on Con-
gress to legislate to enforce the amendments. Because of the close relationship be-
tween the antinobility clause and equal protection, and the similarity between the
values each protects, see supra text accompanying notes 125-42, the power for certain
measures aimed at reducing nobility might be found under these other clauses. An
equal protection constraint on federal action also has been read into the fifth amend-
ment due process clause. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). Another possible
ground for antinobility legislation is the commerce clause; this clause was invoked to
validate the 1964 Civil Rights Act in, for example, Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). The commerce clause would be an especially appropriate
basis in areas where official favoritism threatened economic harm to the nation. See
supra text accompanying notes 76-78 (colonial objection to nobility based, in part, on
belief that nobility is economically inefficient).
190. See sources cited supra note 123 (wealthy wield disproportionate influence in
American politics).
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the past, such measures have been found to violate rights of ex-
pression or political participation. 191 But if enacted to promote
antinobility aims, narrowly drawn rules might constitutionally
further a compelling interest.
192
C. Antinobility Values Used to Support Legislative Reform
In addition to providing a basis for challenging or justifying
legislation in court, antinobility concerns might spur legislative re-
form of existing programs. 193 President Reagan's original pro-
gram of supply-side economics will serve as illustration. In his
1980 presidential campaign, Ronald Reagan announced a com-
prehensive program of economic reform. His program called for
regressive tax cuts and deregulation intended to stimulate spend-
ing, industry, and production; elimination or curtailment of social
programs; and increased military spending. 194 President Reagan
successfully effectuated most of these changes in the first two years
of his presidency.195
Although aimed at improving the economy of the nation as a
whole, Reagan's program benefited primarily the wealthy and
those engaged in industrial production.196 Upper-income taxpay-
191. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
192. This is not to say that the antinobility clauses should trump any and every
first amendment claim. The clauses, after all, are part of the original Constitution. In
cases of direct conflict, the first amendment, coming later as it did, should supervene
any clause in that original document. When the two conflict only indirectly, anti-
nobility values should play a part. in the balancing process which first amendment
analysis generally requires. L. TRIBE, supra note 7, §§ 12-2, -20.
193. See infra text accompanying notes 213-15 (legislative compared with judicial
relief for nobility clause violations).
194. Presidential Message to the Congress, 17 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 130
(Feb. 18, 1981); EXPERIMENT, supra note 11, at xv, 4-5, 8-10, 19, 31-58, 77, 97-153.
195. EXPERIMENT, supra note 11, at 1-2; see Three Steps Forward Two Back: A
Balance Sheet on Reagan's Efforts to Deregulate America, TIME, Aug. 20, 1983, at 12
[hereinafter cited as Three Steps Forwara].
Congress, after a two-year honeymoon, began asserting itself in late 1982, revers-
ing or softening some of the harsher features of Reagan's program. Hess, The 97th
Congress: Retreat from Reaganomics, San Francisco Sunday Examiner & Chron.,
Dec. 26, 1982, at A-6, col. 1. Reagan's original program remains a useful example for
antinobility analysis, however; indeed, its principal features remain intact.
196. THE REAGAN RECORD 317-44 (J. Palmer & I. Sawhill eds. 1982) [hereinafter
cited as RECORD]; Money Flow, TIME, Aug. 27, 1984, at 22; Samuelson, Fashionable
Fears Notwithstanding, the Middle Class is Not Vanishing, L.A. Times, Jan. 22, 1984,
pt. IV, at 3, col. I (analyzing recent studies of economic trends and finding that pretax
income of wealthiest fifth of families "has reached levels not seen in decades"); Three
Steps Forward, supra note 195, at 12-14; Thurow, 4 Rising Tide ofPoverty, NEWS-
WEEK, July 11, 1983, at 62 [hereinafter cited as A Rising Tide]; see also Maitland, Bar
Group Finds Retreat on Civil Rights Under Reagan, N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1982, at A-
18, col. 1.
I selected the Reagan program because it is likely to be familiar to most readers
and because it has attracted persistent criticism of inequitability. I do not intend to
exclude the possibility that earlier administrations might be equally culpable. It
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ers gained most from the changed income tax structure.197 Corpo-
rate taxes were reduced even more than those of individual
taxpayers, 98 and liberalized depreciation allowances permitted
businesses to write off substantial sums from their tax returns
without showing increased productivity or investment. 199 Estate
taxes were reduced.
2°°
In addition to transferring wealth to business and the affluent,
the administration provided ready access to political power for
these groups. The President selected advisors who are themselves
wealthy; a number have been California millionaires. 20 ' A high
percentage of his appointees to agency and sub-Cabinet positions
were wealthy white males from Western states; 20 2 relatively few
women, members of racial minority groups, or working-class per-
sons were appointed.
20 3
As a result of Reagan's economic reorganization, entrepre-
neurs and high-income persons prospered, while the condition of
the poor worsened. 2°4 The incidence of poverty increased to its
could be argued that pre-Reagan regimes, by permitting or encouraging an economy
based on high inflation and rapidly rising wages and prices, injured persons on fixed
incomes (such as the aged) while enriching speculators and persons in strong unions,
thereby contravening the values if not the letter of the antinobility clauses. These
questions lie beyond the scope of this Part, the purpose of which is illustration.
197. EXPERIMENT, supra note 11, at 8, 21, 116-18, 482-83; RECORD, supra note
196, at 22; Havemann, Poor Lose, Rich Gain Under Reagan, Budget Office Says, L.A.
Times, April 5, 1984, pt. I, at 1, col. I (Congressonal Budget Office reported that tax
and spending cuts enacted under the Reagan Administration have added $7070 in-
come to families with income of $80,000, and have cost $270 in lost income to families
with income of less than $10,000); Rich ...Poor- Tax Gap Widens, L.A. Times,
April 5, 1984, pt. II, at 6, col. 1; Wealthy Reap Third of Al Tax Benefits, L.A. Times,
Nov. 21, 1982, pt. I, at 1, col. 3 (top 4.4% of taxpayers prime beneficiaries of tax
relief); see also The Super-Rich Who Paid No Income Tax, San Francisco Chron.,
Jan. 8, 1985, at 4, col. I (Internal Revenue Service report indicated that number of
returns over $200,000 increased sharply in recent years but portion paying no tax rose
as result of new tax loopholes).
198. EXPERIMENT, supra note I1, at 8, 110.
199. Id at 8, 110-11, 468; cf. Kinsley, Greed, Envy. God-Given Wealth andPoverty
Reagan Style, L.A. Times, Feb. 21, 1984, pt. II, at 5, col. 2 (supply-side economics, as
practiced by Reagan Administration, not merit based).
200. EXPERIMENT, supra note 11, at 468-69. This reduction, of course, largely
benefited the wealthy. Id.
201. E.g., R. BROWNSTEIN & N. EASTON, REAGAN'S RULING CLASS: PORTRAITS
OF THE PRESIDENT'S Top ONE HUNDRED OFFICIALS (1982) (98 of 100 officials pro-
filed are white, 95 male, 28 millionaires) [hereinafter cited as RULING CLASS]; L.
CANNON, REAGAN (1982) (role of California millionaires in financing Reagan's
candidacy).
202. Sources cited supra note 201; see May, Rights Panel Assails Reagan Appoint-
ments, L.A. Times, June 15, 1983, pt. I, at 1, col. 2.
203. Sources cited supra note 202; The Reagan Brand on the Judiciary, TIME, Feb.
28, 1983, at 74 ("another glaring absence: new black faces").
204. E.g., EXPERIMENT, supranote 11, at 254-69 (prosperity not "trickling down");
id at 460, 477, 480, 482-83 ("changes introduced thus far make the distribution of
income less equal and require some sacrifices by low-income families while granting
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highest level in 17 years.20 5 Median family income dropped 3.5
percent in 1981 alone, while that of the poorest sector dropped
even more.20 6 Although Congress eased some of the harsher as-
pects of Reagan's program in the second and third years of his
presidency,207 many remain.20 8 Some observers have warned that
large tax cuts to high-income families," id at 483); RECORD, supra note 196, at 21-22,
317-44; A Rising Tide, supra note 196; Bleak Portraits, Two Surveys ofBlack Privation,
TIME, Jan. 30, 1984, at 15 [hereinafter cited as Bleak Portraits]; What's Fair? A New
Study Livens the Issue, TIME, Apr. 16, 1984, at 23 [hereinafter cited as What's Fair.].
Many low-income families lost wage earners as unemployment rose. EXPERIMENT,
supra note 11, at 470 (original purpose of social cuts was to give poor an incentive to
work, but few are able to work, id. at 472); A Rising Tide, supra note 196, at 62;
Church, Facing the Jobs Issue, TIME, Oct. 25, 1982, at 18.
The Reagan administration also made program changes that made it more diffi-
cult for low-income persons to escape poverty. These include cuts in low-income
assistance programs, EXPERIMENT, supra note 11, at 15, 469; RECORD, supra note 196,
at 13-14, 177-217; Jencks, Discrimination and Thomas Sowell, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Mar.
3, 1983, at 33; support for elementary and secondary education, EXPERIMENT, supra
note I1, at 16; public legal services, id at 16; The Return of Unequal Justice?, TIME,
Dec. 27, 1982, at 48; health maintenance organizations, EXPERIMENT, supra note 11,
at 16; federal aid for college and university students, id at 344-59; school lunch pro-
grams, id at 17, 380; Eating Away at Nutrition, L.A. Times, Nov. 30, 1982, pt. II, at 6,
col. 1; deductions for child care, EXPERIMENT, supra note 11, at 17; grants for immu-
nization, id at 18; the Job Corps, id at 18; and nutrition for low-income pregnant
women, infants, and children, id at 18, 469-70; A Rising Tide, supra note 196; Hume,
Food Stamps Cuts Seen as Hurting Poorest Families, L.A. Times, Apr. 14, 1983, pt. I,
at 10, col. 1. Federal enforcement for occupational safety and equal access for the
handicapped slackened, CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, AMERICAN CHILDREN IN POV-
ERTY (1984) (increase in child mortality and poverty are traceable, in part, to current
administration's economic program); EXPERIMENT, supra note 11, at 131-36, 341-42,
344; Jencks, supra; Three Steps Forward, supra note 195, at 12-14; Bias "Excludes"
Blacks, Rights Group Charges, L.A. Times, June 8, 1983, pt. I, at 1, col. 4; Administra-
tion Hitfor Health, Safety Cutbacks, L.A. Times, May 8, 1983, pt. I, at 23, col. 3;
Maitland, supra note 196; Reagan's Bill on Racial Bias Faces Trouble, Wall St. J., Feb.
1, 1982, at 23, col. 3 [hereinafter cited as Reagan's Bill]. For a comparison of U.S.
health and social welfare statistics with those of 11 major industrialized nations, see
generally R. REICH & I. MAGAZINER, supra note 64.
205. EXPERIMENT, supra note 11, at 19; Poor Measures-A Study Chronicles Pov-
erty's Rise, TIME, March 5, 1984, at 14 (new Census Bureau study showed increase in
U.S. poverty and rebutted administration's position that statistical methods used in
earlier studies overstated problem); see What's Fair, supra note 204 (Census Bureau
figures show number of Americans in poverty jumped 30% in three years mainly be-
cause of cuts instituted by Reagan Administration); Greenstein, The Bottom Line on
Poverty Cuts in Aid, Food, Health, Housing Hit Families the Worst, L.A. Times, Apr.
29, 1984, pt. IV, at 5, col. 1 (same); see also RECORD, supra note 196, at 14 (poverty
unlikely to drop to 1970's level even if economic growth occurs).
206. EXPERIMENT, supra note 1I; see Bleak Portraits, supra note 204; Typical In-
come Is Coming Back from a Decline, Philadelphia Inquirer, Oct. 7, 1984, at 3-A, col.
5 (census study shows 3.5% decline of average family earnings); Conyers, Justice
Dept. 's "Color-Blind"Policy, L.A. Times, May 15, 1983, pt. V, at 5, col. 2 (income gap
between whites and blacks growing).
207. Hess, supra note 195; see also Reagan's Bill, supra note 204.
208. See supra notes 11, 204 and accompanying text; Kondracke, Why Can't Rea-
gan Hear the Hungry, L.A. Times, Dec. 28, 1983, pt. II, at 5, col. 1; Havemann,
Wel/are Cuts Stir Debate on Impact, L.A. Times, Dec. 26, 1983, pt. I, at 1, col. I;
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unless additional reform is effected, the distance between the most
privileged and least privileged sectors of the population will be-
come unbridgeable. 2
0 9
Besides prohibiting closed, elite classes with special access to
politics, the antinobility clauses serve a number of ancillary goals
or values-avoiding loss of political diversity, preventing demor-
alization, and guarding against corruption of the recipients of gov-
ernmental largesse. 210 Critics point to disquieting evidence that
each of these dangers has begun to materialize in the Reagan
administration.
21'
Nordlinger, Pangs of Hunger Spreading Coast to Coast in U.S., L.A. Times, Dec. 20,
1983, pt. IA, at 6, col. 1. President Reagan's 1984 budget would do little to reverse the
harm already done. Rosenblatt, Cutbacks Focus Mainly on "Poorest" as Outlays
Shrink by $2.8 Billion, L.A. Times, Feb. 2, 1984, pt. 1, at 15, col. I (analyzing proposed
budget and finding it "would concentrate on trimming federal funds going to the
poorest Americans, while leaving Social Security and Medicare largely untouched";
chart shows increased military spending for 1985 budgets); see Havemann, Welfare
Studies Fault Cutsfor Strain on Working Poor, L.A. Times, Mar. 31, 1984, pt. I, at 3,
col. I (discussing studies by GAO and Center for Study of Social Policy indicating
that cuts in AFDC have pushed many working poor below poverty line).
209. See sources cited supra note 11. Although the Reagan economic program as
a whole would seem to infringe on many of the values proposed for the antinobility
clause, it is by no means clear that it is vulnerable to equal protection challenge. The
program is minimally rational, but see Klott, 'Supply-Side' Claims Doubted, Tax Im-
pact Seen Mainly on the Rich, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1984 at D-1, col. 3; it does not
favor a suspect class, since wealth is not a suspect classification; nor does it infringe
upon fundamental rights, since the political favoritism it espouses does not undercut
the right to vote.
210. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
211. (1) Loss ofpolitical diversity and contributions of commoners. See supra note
202 and accompanying text; Does It Play in Peoria?, TIME, Nov. 1, 1982, at 16, 17;
Nader Says Administration Acts to Dismantle Agencies, L.A. Times, Aug. 31, 1982, pt.
1, at 10, col. I (critic laments "sameness of people" in the administration: "You don't
see a real maverick . . . . You don't see someone who is going to be a hairshirt,
someone who's going to be a naysayer.").
(2) Demoralization. See Bleak Portraits, supra note 204 ("dispiriting" impact on
poor black families); Taylor, A Growing Mood of Dismay, TIME, July 5, 1982, at 42; As
Poor Lose Hope, Our Riches Diminish, USA TODAY, July 22, 1983, at 8A, col. 1;
Rights Panel Fearful of Violence by Bigots, L.A. Times, Jan. 12, 1983, pt. A, at 9, col. 2
(seeming unconcern by administration fueling upsurge of racial violence and an-
tisemitism); see also Cimons, Panel to Study Disparity in Health Care, L.A. Times, Jan.
8, 1984, pt. I, at I, col. 3 (health gap between privileged and underprivileged growing;
increasing differences found in longevity and infant mortality).
(3) Corruption of the recipients of governmental largesse. The Reagan administra-
tion has visibly adopted many of the traditional mannerisms and accoutrements of
nobility-ostentatious parties, designer gowns, expensive china, horseback riding, fre-
quent vacations, limousines, and a tendency to speak coldly or condescendingly of the
poor and their problems. See Jacobs, State Gala under September Skies, Reagan's
Host Partyfor Marcoses in the Rose Garden, L.A. Times, Sept. 20, 1982, pt. VI, at 2,
col. I (unusually lavish entertainment of visiting head of state); Radcliffe, Marcos
Critics Raise Flack Over U.S. Visit, L.A. Times, Sept. 20, 1982, pt. VI, at 3, col. !; see
also Abramson, 19 U.S. Agents Reported with Son of Reagan, L.A. Times, Oct. 30,
1982, pt. 1, at 1, col. 2 (extravagantly escorted vacation trip to England). For Reagan
administration attitudes toward the poor, see Trying to Make Amends, TIME, Aug. 15,
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The Reagan program thus appears to meet many, if not all of
the formal criteria of nobility.212 It also urgently implicates the
values of the antinobility clauses. Any judicial challenge to the
Reagan program as a whole, or even to major portions of it, would
be misconceived, however. 213 The relief would be too vast and
far-reaching, the court's action too political.214 But this does not
mean that resurgent nobility is beyond remediation merely be-
cause it occurs on a large scale. The unlikelihood of judicial cor-
rection makes congressional reconsideration of the harsher aspects
of the Reagan program plausible and appropriate. To some ex-
tent, this process has already begun.215
CONCLUSION
The principal threat to equality may no longer be outright,
blatant discrimination against minorities, the poor, and other vul-
nerable persons and groups. Society is now sensitized to recognize
this kind of oppression and can call on an arsenal of legal reme-
dies to stop it. Although the enthusiasm with which state and fed-
eral agencies enforce protective legislation varies, most at least do
not actively oppose enforcement.
A more immediate, and less recognized, threat to equality is
posed by governmental actions that centralize wealth, privilege,
1983, at 10-11 (labelling millionaire Agriculture Secretary's one-week experiment of
living on $58 dollar allowance, "playing poor, a demonstration ... more patronizing
than constructive"); Kurtz, Official Says Latinos Prefer Overcrowding, L.A. Times,
May 12, 1984, pt. I, at 15, col. I (HUD official said figures indicating severe over-
crowding in Hispanic families explained by preference--I'm told that they don't
mind, and they prefer, some prefer, doubling up."); Skelton, Reagan Calls Opponents
Anti-Business, Also Says Some of Homeless Choose to Be So, L.A. Times, Feb. 1, 1984,
pt. I, at 6, col. 1; Scherf, Reagan Appointee Downplays Hunger, L.A. Times, Dec. 29,
1983, pt. I, at 7, col. I (Reagan appointee says that malnutrition not major source of
blacks' social problems; black children "may be the best-nourished group in the
United States. Don't tell me you're going to correct complex social problems by
throwing food at them"); Cimons, Meese Remarks on Hunger Stir Angry Protests, L.A.
Times, Dec. 10, 1983, pt. I, at 1, col. 2 (spokesman criticized for denying existence of
hungry children in U.S.).
212. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text. One criterion that arguably
is not fulfilled is that of a closed class, since a poor person theoretically can work
hard, join the class benefited by Reaganomics, and reap the benefits afforded by that
program. But see supra note 204 (Reagan administration cut programs, such as sup-
port for education, job training, and nutrition, that enable the poor to change their
social position).
213. To recall, this section's purpose is to illustrate a situation which calls for legis-
lative reform of existing programs. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 151-67 and accompanying text (justiciability of claims under
the antinobility clauses).
215. EXPERIMENT, supra note 11, at ii-xii; Havemann, $8 Billion Cut in Domestic
Aid Soughtfor '85, L.A. Times, Jan. 6, 1983, pt. 1, at 1, col 5 (congressional pressure to
withdraw cuts proposed by Reagan in school lunches, food stamps, and similar pro-
grams); Hess, supra note 195; Reagan's Bill, supra note 204.
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and power in a small sector of the population, coupled with indif-
ference to those falling outside the inner circle. This Article ar-
gued that certain transfers of benefits to a selected few
unacceptably impair democratic values. It proposed legal ma-
chinery, in the form of the antinobility clauses, to challenge those
transfers. The Article reviewed constitutional history and case
law to ascertain the clauses' central meaning and distilled a four-
part test for their application. It discussed the advantages of such
an approach and considered objections to it. The Article con-
cluded by applying antinobility analysis to earlier cases decided
on other grounds, to a hypothetical program creating a biological
elite, to election law reform, and to President Reagan's supply-
side economics.
